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Abstract
The delirium of change: Giles Deleuze’s optimistic postmodernism
Giles Deleuze’s theories o f  domination and change represent a radical 
departure from both modern radicalism and the nihilism o f  many post­
modernists. Deleuze has developed a comprehensive critique o f  domination 
within societies, and offers an alternative vision, based on the rejection o f  
the routinized patterning o f the individual's life experiences. One o f  his 
major works, Capitalism and Schizophrenia (1988) was written in 
collaboration with Felix Guattari. An ex-psychoanalyst, Guattari brought a 
specific focus to bear on the limitations o f  conventional approaches to 
therapy, its wider social implications and the alternatives thereto, a theme 
which is absent in Deleuze's later works. It is argued that while this vision 
provides a totally different alternative to many o f  the tired debates 
surrounding order and revolution, by its very nature it is limited, designed 
to appeal to a limited grouping o f  insiders, and is inadequately equipped to 
deal with the negative face o f  localised ethno-particularism which has 
emerged in the 1990s.
1. Introduction
One o f the major criticisms levelled against postmodern social theory is its 
seeming pessimism. In contrast to the assumption of ultimate social progress 
which underlies much o f the modernist project, postmodernism makes no claims 
as to the inevitability o f a better life. Yet, within postmodernism there are certain 
key divisions, one o f the most important being between the ultimately nihilist 
stance o f thinkers such as Baudrillard, and the more optimistic vision o f others, 
such as Giles Deleuze. This article focuses on Deleuze’s conceptions of 
individual and collective action, and social change -  an area o f  his writings 
probably o f  the most direct interest to the sociologist. It should be noted that this 
area forms but one dimension o f Deleuze’s extremely broad writings, and should 
be seen as distinct, yet related to his other studies. The latter consists o f works of 
selected philosophers, including not only Kant and Nietzsche, but also Sacher-
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Masoch, an excursus on “Alice in Wonderland” and, more recently, his 
monumental study o f cinema, both as an art form and a reflection o f social reality 
(Deleuze, 1989). Much o f his work on oppression and change was in 
collaboration with psychoanalyst Felix Guattari. In these collaborative works, a 
major focus is on the role o f  conventional psychology as an instrument o f  social 
control, and alternative approaches to therapy. These issues receive less attention 
in Deleuze’s individual works. However, in common with the individual works, 
the collaborative writings also cover issues o f wider social order and control.
2. Space and time
Deleuze (1983:70) asserts that the odyssey through life is a series o f lines. Firstly 
there is one’s linear progression through a number o f complementary specialised 
social environments, from family, to school, to the work environment, and, 
finally, to the infirmary. Secondly, there is the more complex molecular line. 
This is the line o f social interactions, o f one’s follies and fears -  a line which is 
ultimately reflected in one’s linear progression. The third line tracks downward, 
o f one’s destination to the unknown and unexpected. It is through the recognition 
of these three aspects o f the individual’s temporal journey that personal liberation 
is possible.
Deleuze (1983:72) asserts that this liberation may be brought about either through 
“schizo-analysis” or “micro-politics” . “Schizo-analysis” is the technique outlined 
in detail by Deleuze, in collaboration with Felix Guattari in their joint work, Anti- 
Oedipus (1983a). This work is grounded in a critique o f  conventional approaches 
to psychotherapy, drawing on Guattari’s own experiences as a psychoanalyst. 
However, as will become apparent, Anti-Oedipus links issues concerning the 
individual psyche with wider social injustice, sketching a far broader critique o f 
social reality. Some o f the latter themes are carried through to  D eleuze’s 
subsequent works (which were written on his own), although the psychologically- 
orientated framework outlined in collaboration with Guattari is abandoned (e.g. 
Cinema 2: The Time Image [1989]).
In Anti-Oedipus, Deleuze and Guattari assert that the status quo channels 
individuals in a specific direction in such a manner that most desire to follow it, 
deviance being ultimately equated with madness (Deleuze, 1989:34). It is 
impossible in a brief article to fully discuss the plethora o f interlocking arguments 
and conclusions in this monumental work, much o f which builds on the works of 
Wilhelm Reich. Acknowledging this debt, Deleuze and Guattari assert that their 
major departure from that theorist is that Reich still believed in the conception o f 
rationality “as what it ought to be ... and the irrational element in desire, and by 
regarding only this latter as a suitable object for psychoanalytic examination” 
(Deleuze & Guattari, 1983a:29).
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Basically, Deleuze and Guattari assert that conventional psychoanalysis forms an 
integral component o f existing structures o f control and domination in society, 
expressly designed to curb unruly social practices, rather than assist the 
individual. In contrast, “schizo-analysis” focuses on the social context, and the 
individual quest for liberation therefrom. Thus, what is considered to be mental 
illness, may be an individual quest for freedom, with it and “ schizo-analysis” 
constituting a libratory form o f “micro-politics” . It can be argued that this 
approach is inherently limited. Whilst Deleuze and Guattari do supply a useful 
counterweight to the excesses o f Freudian psychoanalysis, they do little to 
provide concrete guidelines for assisting those afflicted with mental illness, be it 
o f social or biological origin, or, for that matter, those around them. Perhaps, in 
this area, their demolition o f existing social and psychological constructs is too 
complete, and too little has been left to replace it. Significantly, whilst 
sympathetic to many o f Deleuze and Guattari’s arguments in this area, even 
Michel Foucault never took schizo-analysis seriously, or saw it as a realistic 
alternative to psychotherapy (Miller, 1993:282).
Although it retains a concern with the individual, a contemporary work to the first 
volume o f Capitalism and Schizophrenia, “Politics”, written by Deleuze on his 
own (cf. Deleuze & Guattari, 1983a:87-l 02), is far more concerned with the 
emergent dangers in the quest for individual liberation, rather than prescribing 
specific strategies. Indeed, Deleuze (1983:93) concedes that the most creative 
and libratory o f the three life lines, the molecular line, incorporates certain 
inherent dangers. On the one hand, there is the “black hole phenomenon” -  the 
phenomenon o f stepping over the personal edge into oblivion, as per Kurtz in 
Conrad’s Heart o f  Darkness (Wakefield, 1990). On the other hand, there is the 
possibility o f “micro-fascism”, “Stalin’s little groups”, “neighbourhood 
dispensers o f justice” -  in other words, an extreme devolution o f power, 
although, according to Deleuze, desirable, may itself result in domination, albeit 
at a more personal level.
3. Deleuze and history
A general problem with postmodernist social theory is that postmodernism is at 
once a methodological tool, a theoretical frame o f reference, and a description of 
contemporary society (society has entered a postmodern age). In Deleuze’s 
writings, these three issues are particularly conflated. In contrast to many other 
postmodern social theorists, Deleuze’s perspective is broadly historical, 
concerned with the rise o f the contemporary state. On the one hand, as the major 
site o f repression, the state emerged at a very early stage. On the other hand, the 
technologies o f domination are very much more advanced in contemporary 
society (Deleuze, 1989), making the possibility o f social liberation more difficult. 
Thus, despite the above-mentioned historical approach, Deleuze devotes the bulk
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of his attention to a description o f contemporary reality. Similarly, the solutions 
proposed are specifically focused on the postmodern age (see Deleuze, 1983).
4. T erritorialization and flight
A persistent theme in Deleuze’s writings is that o f space and territory. Deleuze 
assumes that space and territory exist at three levels: at the level o f  physical 
space, in terms o f the freedom-domination nexus, and, following on Foucault, in 
terms o f the overlapping and, at times, conflicting, power networks in which the 
individual is enmeshed. All three levels may operate simultaneously, in a 
complementary and contradictory fashion. In understanding social life, Deleuze, 
in collaboration with Guattari (1983b:2), argues that one should not only consider 
the current locale o f individuals and groupings within these three levels, but also 
how they actively resist this status, be it through deterritorialization or flight. The 
former is about destroying, or rendering power networks meaningless, and the 
latter about changing locale, seeking an alternative social reality, which may or 
may not be about actual physical movement. The latter, which does not 
presuppose the elimination o f  power relations, Deleuze and Guattari (1983b:5) 
concede is really the only feasible option. This would involve a deformalization 
of social relationships, with interactions being purpose-orientated, and not 
regulated or bound by the complexities o f social norms, routines, and underlying 
power networks (see Deleuze & Guattari, 1988:380). Essentially, what is being 
proposed is a  form o f anarchism, an inversion o f  Durkheim’s concept o f  a 
developing collective consciousness underlying the routinization o f socia! 
interactions (see Durkheim, 1933). Such an inversion presupposes that the 
systematization o f  social life is inherently repressive, and cannot be considered as 
social progress. Deleuze and Guattari’s anarchism differs from the European 
anarchist tradition in that it accords no special role to any majority grouping in 
society such as the working class, and instead promotes the particular, the 
different and the mutant (cf. Sorel, 1925).
Deleuze and Guattari (1983b:5) argue that in addition to the operation and speed 
o f flight, such radical actions also concern machinic relationships (inter alia, 
between the individual and social groupings), and the rather chilling concept o f 
“bodies without organs”, B.W.O. The latter concept, again, encompasses two, 
rather distinct, yet related meanings, both o f which are closely related to earlier 
concepts introduced by Foucault. Firstly, there is the meaning in terms o f  bio­
power, o f the individual’s body within power networks. Non-compliance results 
in physical action being placed on the individual, either in terms o f physical 
violence, or, more commonly in modem societies, the individual being coercively 
removed from the public eye, and placed under constant surveillance, as part o f 
the dominating interests’ normalising technologies (Foucault, 1979). This notion
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echoes the medieval concept o f “The Man o f Sorrows”, o f Christ’s physical body 
bearing the strains o f the world.
Secondly, there is an even darker meaning. Shortly prior to his death, in 
interviews, Foucault gave detailed accounts o f the benefits o f extreme sado- 
maschochistic sexual practices. Inter alia, the benefits would include the de- 
sensualization o f the sexual organs and the eroticization o f the entire body. This 
concept may seem to echo M arcuse’s call for the eroticization o f social life, going 
beyond the conventional sexual act (see Kettler, 1978:17). However, Foucault’s 
meaning is somewhat more complex than M arcuse’s. The latter held that this 
would entail the freeing o f creative influences, and that of ushering in a new era 
o f social harmony and creativity. To Foucault, the spreading o f sensuality is also 
about power and domination, which will exist in all social contexts, and the 
pleasurable face thereof.
Deleuze and Guattari (1983a) echo Foucault’s thinking in their detailed, loving 
descriptions o f sado-maschochistic torture, involving the sewing up o f  bodily 
orifices as a path to liberation. However, their conceptions are somewhat more 
abstract and symbolic than Foucault’s views on the matter. Deleuze and Guattari 
(1983a:282) assert that it represents the epitome of production, o f 
“antiproduction”, o f opposition to the existing operations or workings o f society. 
As a critique o f Freudian theories, they assert that the schizophrenic’s frequent 
claim o f an inner emptiness reflects an escape from an oppressive social reality 
(Deleuze & Guattari, 1983a:8), the ultimate deterritorialization and flight from the 
physical body itself. Sado-maschochistic torture would represent only one o f a 
number o f possible lines o f flight, others o f which could include forms o f political 
action. The latter possibility is most explicitly developed in Deleuze’s “ solo 
w orks”, when, as noted above, the strong focus on alternatives to psycho-therapy 
that is a feature o f his collaborative works with Felix Guattari, is diluted. Thus, 
reflecting his close links with Maoist politics in the 1960s (see Miller, 1993:195), 
Deleuze (1983:87) asserts that some o f the most creative lines o f flight and action 
are in fleeing repressive adversaries, citing M ao’s Long March as one such 
example. The Long March was not only a flight from KMT domination, but also 
a proving ground, and a process whereby a new political system was developed. 
However, Deleuze concedes that such potentially liberating actions can easily 
result in “reterritorialization”, in new forms o f repression and domination 
replacing the old.
Interestingly, in a later joint work with Guattari (Deleuze & Guattari, 1988:470) 
he asserts that micro-tribal movements, those localised nationalist movements 
seeking autonomy incorporate certain potentially beneficial components. They 
cut themselves off from the “majority”, that oppressively homogeneous grouping 
in any society which denies individual autonomy, and, indeed, forms the basis o f
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authority and domination. Recognizing such movements as a fundamental 
challenge to its existence, the state will seek to avoid the granting o f  complete 
local autonomy, seeking instead greater binding through a series o f  deals offering 
supposed “local government” or “devolution o f  power” .
In 1988 Deleuze and Guattari (1988:470) argued that when all society fragments 
itself into groupings o f minority, greater freedom is possible, “minority as a 
universal figure, or becoming-everybody/everything” . Once minorities break free 
from the “plane o f capital”, from seeing themselves in terms o f other groupings in 
society, it is possible to completely escape existing power networks (Deleuze & 
Guattari, 1988:472). Since then, petty nationalist movements not only within 
Europe, but also in many areas o f  the developing world have proliferated. These 
movements do indeed constitute attempts to break away from domination by what 
is perceived to be an alien majority. In many cases, they represent the response 
to the bankruptcy o f grand ideologies and the loss o f  meaning associated with 
globalization. However, few o f  these movements have themselves demonstrated 
greater tolerance, nor for that matter the rights o f  other minorities. In most cases, 
ethnic identity is defined not just in terms of a specific meaning, but also in terms 
o f difference, in perceived superiority to others. The fragmentation o f  multi­
ethnic states has often gone hand-in-hand with ethnic cleansing. It is evident that 
the libratory micro-tribalism espoused by Deleuze and Guattari easily mutates to 
new systems o f domination, often little different in operation to the previous 
order.
5. Pow er and the state
The individual’s odyssey through life implies ongoing contact with power 
relations, which, indeed, are a form o f “over-coding mechanism” (Deleuze, 
1983:78). Complex power relations and networks are in operation in society, the 
most important concentration being the state (Deleuze, 1983:78). The state’s 
capacity for domination is most refined in the advanced societies, where 
ritualization ultimately permits the operation o f  a highly developed over-coding 
machinery. In other words, mechanisms o f domination cannot ultimately control 
the individual’s life path. However, they will seek to channel it, to shape and 
form it. Should the line waver from the approved path, the overcoding 
mechanisms come into play, seeking to redirect it into an approved path 
(Deleuze, 1983:80).
Deleuze and Guattari (1988:430) assert that there is no inherent reason why 
societies should tend to the more complex, or whether groups o f  small villages or 
towns are less advanced than states. Rather, the process o f state formation is that 
o f binding or capture, in the form o f precedents, laws, and the emergence o f 
property. “Free action ... is compared, linked, and subordinated to a common and 
homogeneous quality called labour” (Deleuze & Guattari, 1988:442). It employs
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violence to contradict those who set themselves in opposition to its order, either 
in challenging its monopoly o f violence or engaging in other forms o f  conduct 
which were legal prior to the state’s seizure of dominance over society.
Although capitalism presupposes certain market mechanisms which operate 
independently of the state, such mechanisms are subject to “axioms”, being 
“ stopping points ... reordering ... which prevents decoded flows ... from escaping 
in all directions” (Deleuze & Guattari, 1988:461). In other words, the centrifugal 
tendencies in capitalism, reflected in repeated crises, are contained through state 
intervention, an example being Roosevelt’s New Deal following the 1929 Wall 
Street crash. In general, axioms represent low key adjustments, often responses 
to struggles at the localised level. In the extreme case, axioms mutate to form a 
“ fictitious proliferation, a multiplication by subtraction” -  fascism (Deleuze & 
Guattari, 1988:461).
It should be noted that whilst the state’s primary function is a regulating one, 
operating through routinized mechanisms, it coexists with the mechanism o f 
physical coercion, “the war machine” (Deleuze, 1983:102). Although it might 
seem that the latter is simply an integral part o f the former, the latter’s role is 
largely destructive, and coexists uneasily with the state mechanisms dedicated 
towards the routinized preservation o f painstakingly constructed structures o f 
regulation and control.
In their second major joint work (in fact, sub-titled the second volume Anti- 
Oedipus), Deleuze and Guattari (1988:424) assert that the war machine indeed is 
exterior to political sovereignty. They assert that political sovereignty itself 
encompasses two poles, the “magical” leader who institutes sovereignty by 
means o f  force o f  personality, followed by those who regulate and institutionalise 
it. Once established, the state seeks to expropriate the war machine, to bring it 
under its sway (Deleuze & Guattari, 1988:425), gaining a monopoly on violence. 
In contrast to conventional theories o f the state, Deleuze and Guattari believe that 
this does not necessarily make society any more humane, but rather increasingly 
sophisticated, yet brutal mechanisms will be employed to secure authority. In the 
end, the means o f violence is either the property o f  the state, and a prerequisite 
for its existence, or an independent centre o f power opposed to it. They believe 
that the capture o f the means o f violence by a centralised state made changes in 
production possible and not vice versa (Deleuze & Guattari, 1988:430). This 
does not mean that the war machine cannot regain autonomy, as indeed has 
happened in many societies in the developing world. However, this regaining 
does not mean a return to some primitive ideal or some “zig-zag evolution” to an 
inevitable conclusion. Rather, it is a temporal and spatial movement, reflecting 
changes in the topography o f power.
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6. Rhizom es, concealm ent and action
Another persistent metaphor employed by Deleuze in his collaborative work with 
Guattari is that o f root systems. Employing the pagan Norse image o f a tree 
(Yggdraisal) as the centre o f the world, they see the dominant root system as 
reflecting prevailing social reality. M odem society has multiple (radicet) roots, 
reflecting the multiple social influences being brought to bear on the central 
project. Beyond modernity is the alternative system o f rhizomes, the centre o f a 
plethora o f conflicting “ semiotic chains” (Deleuze & Guattari, 1983b: 11). 
Ideally, rhizomes should be free to expand in all possible directions. Invariably, 
however, social options are limited, with “deviants” being channelled back into 
acceptable paths (see Deleuze & Guattari, 1983b:41). Violence is employed 
against those who are seen as violent -  “criminals” , primitives, and nomads -  
those who challenge the existing order, the existing peace (Deleuze & Guattari, 
1988:448). Returning to the spatial metaphor, it is argued that a rhizome is a 
“node o f plateaus”, of space for free action, without beginning or end, the 
freedom of the nomad, that has to be understood through radically different 
mechanisms o f analysis (Deleuze & Guattari, 1988:53; cf. Dunn, 1991:131). 
This action is neither constrained nor anchored through a central taproot.
7. Good and evil
Deleuze’s writings do not provide a clear indication o f what is most desirable or 
progressive, and, indeed, are profoundly amoral. Indeed, it is argued that choices 
between, and definitions o f good and evil, are simply temporary choices, which 
can readily be reversed. Even the will to power, as envisaged by Nietzsche, is no 
longer a cleansing force. Deleuze argues that in the postmodern age, in both the 
individual and in society, in philosophy and reality, the will to power had turned 
inward, had become essential suicidal (Miller, 1993:197). However, Deleuze 
believes that it is indeed possible to stop short o f  becoming a “will to nothing” . It 
is possible to stop short o f “madness and suicide”, harnessing the creative side of 
the will to power, distilling its vital essence, “a monstrous and lawless becoming” 
(Miller, 1993:198).
8. M etaphors and reality
Deleuze employs a complex range o f metaphors in his works, that both brilliantly 
illustrates and confuses his premises and arguments. Although these metaphors 
are wide ranging, they are most frequently in terms o f  pagan Norse belief 
systems, Bronze and Stone Age Western Europe, and, most commonly, the 
nomads o f Central and Eastern Asia. In fact, Deleuze travelled rarely outside the 
confines o f Paris, did little empirical study o f nomadic society on a structured 
basis, his descriptions being often more fanciful than factual. Nonetheless, these 
parables do provide key insights into the dynamics o f social life, particularly o f
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the nexus between regulation, order and domination, and freedom, action and 
autonomy. Said (1990:2) asserts that rather than providing an abridgement and 
description o f a particular set o f social practices, Deleuze’s writings represent “a 
concotation o f brilliant work, we are unlikely to see again for a generation”, a 
combination o f a mystical aestheticism, and an analysis o f the limits and 
possibilities o f libratory politics.
Deleuze (1983:87) is critical o f conventional revolutionary politics, asserting that 
power and desire are closely related, the desire for change often being a desire for 
power. This is a major reason why Deleuze’s recipes for political action are 
somewhat opaque, and quite clearly designed for a small grouping o f insiders, 
those who have mastered the complex forces operating on those seeking to break 
loose from domination. However, he does outline a revolutionary programme, 
orientated around localised, particularised activism.
9. Techniques for change
Deleuze asserts that it is possible to cast aside the state’s mechanisms of 
domination, along with the stultifying notions o f guilt, pity, logic, and reason 
(Miller, 1993:197). However, the appropriation o f  mechanisms o f  domination by 
the state does not mean that its overcoding mechanisms will always function 
efficiently, that “decoded flows” will cease to occur. In other words, individuals 
or micro-collectives can, and will continue to seek to escape the homogenizing 
power o f  the state.
Indeed, the existence o f such mechanisms presupposes the existence o f such 
flows or tendencies, although wherever possible, the state will seek to prevent 
them from combining or complementing each other. Essentially, one is dealing 
with a series o f  contradictions, which can be summarised as follows:
•  Although seeking to overcode individuals in a uniform fashion, the state’s 
existence presupposes the existence o f decoded flows.
•  The state aims to stop the unification or consolidation o f  these flows which are 
also the raison de 'être o f its existence.
•  Should these flows combine, new mechanisms o f domination and overcoding 
will emerge therein. Jn other words, the most feasible mechanisms or 
organizations advancing resistance politics are in fact the least desirable.
Deleuze’s conception o f libratory politics is rather close to that o f  Michel 
Foucault. Essentially, Foucault argued that conventional protest movements often 
simply result in new forms o f  domination. Instead the most feasible strategy is to, 
by one means or another, draw attention to the plight o f a particular grouping, 
whereafter they should be left “to speak for themselves” (Poster, 1984:147).
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Foucault put these ideas into practice with his rather ineffectual penal reform 
grouping, GIP (Prisons Information Group).
Baudrillard has argued that in a desire to escape the legacy o f  Stalinism, Foucault 
sought solutions in anarchism, in terrorism, “and other forms o f  useless protest” 
(quoted in Deleuze, 1988:xxix; see Wakefield, 1990:134). Rejecting 
Baudrillard’s assertion, Deleuze asserts that Foucault not only provided a 
comprehensive critique o f the status quo, but also o f Leninist vanguardism. 
Deleuze himself was involved in GIP in the early- to mid-1970s, at this time 
being one o f Foucault’s closest confidants (Miller, 1993:190). By introducing the 
notion o f “outsider” into his works, as adverse to class, Deleuze argues that 
Foucault provided an automatic critique o f Marx.
However, Foucault believed that it was still possible to create a comprehensive 
organization that might play a central role in bringing about real change, a notion 
rejected by Deleuze (1988:xxx). This difference coincided with a personal 
dispute between Foucault and Deleuze (over Foucault’s passionate support for 
the state o f Israel) that resulted in the two thinkers breaking off all contact until 
shortly before Foucault’s death (Miller, 1983:282). In contrast to Foucault’s 
views on the possibilities o f organization, Deleuze and Guattari (1983a:374) 
assert that when “powerful organizations” emerge to represents workers, “they 
get nasty as soon as the nature o f their aims is questioned” .
Unlike Foucault, Deleuze was never a member o f the French Communist Party, 
and his works contain far fewer echoes o f the Marxist tradition. For example, 
there are certain parallels between the concept o f “modes o f  production” and 
Foucault’s “modes o f information” (cf. Poster, 1984). In contrast, Deleuze’s 
conception o f history is that o f overlapping and interwoven lines, linking time, 
space, domination and power, with no clear beginning and end (see Deleuze, 
1989:98-105). However, in common with Weber, Deleuze (both individually, 
and jointly with Guattari) concedes the existence o f certain key dates and turning 
points in history, most notably the emergence o f the state and the war machine 
(Deleuze & Guattari, 1988:430; see Weber, 1950). In addition, “there are all 
kinds of external circumstances that mark profound breaks” such as the rise and 
fall o f great empires (Deleuze & Guattari, 1988:459). However, the latter does 
not concern the abolition o f the state, simply an alteration o f  its form.
10. The limits o f  liberation
As noted earlier, Deleuze recognizes the limitations o f personal liberation. 
Although the schizophrenic is one who flees or seeks to alter an unbearable social 
existence, they by no means are liberated, are real revolutionaries, or possess any 
special insights. Indeed, the schizophrenic is one o f those who have stepped over 
the edge, an “object o f fear and horror” (Deleuze, 1983:98). While advocating
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extremist revolutionary politics, Deleuze (1983:98) expresses horror o f “the 
madman, the addict, and the delinquent”, conceding that some o f the extremist 
solutions advocated “ scare me” . Many in Deleuze’s immediate circle did, 
indeed, fall victim to drugs, madness, or tli-j “micro-fascism” o f random terrorism 
(Miller, 1993:198). Those who seek to marginalize themselves, will, in the end, 
proceed to oblivium “with only occasional micro-fascist utterings ... we are the 
avant garde, we are the marginalized” (Miller, 1993:98). In his desire to confine 
his solutions, Deleuze himself steers close to such an end. However, as Miller 
(1993:194) notes, in contrast to Foucault, Deleuze expressed little interest in 
doing, rather than simply thinking about “the unthinkable”, those areas o f conduct 
barred by society, but, potentially, the most libratory.
11. Conclusion
Deleuze has sketched out a comprehensive critique o f contemporary social 
relations, suggesting a programme for revolutionary change that is radically 
different to the pessimism espoused by most postmodernist thinkers and the 
modernist radical tradition. In his collaborative works with Felix Guattari, both 
alternatives to conventional psychotherapy and the broader question o f social 
liberation are explored. In his individual works, less attention is accorded to the 
role o f conventional psychology as an instrument o f social control, and much 
more free-ranging techniques o f liberation are outlined. In common with Michel 
Foucault, Deleuze asserts that the individual is locked in an inherently repressive, 
yet faceless network o f power relations, and faces constant overt or tacit coercion 
to remain on a set life path. As an alternative, Deleuze offers the way o f the 
human deserter. He concedes that breaking away from the status quo may either 
entail delinquency and madness, or the erection o f alternative and equally 
repressive forms o f social organization. However, it is possible to bring about the 
deroutinization o f social life, a recognition o f individual and minority 
particularities, reducing society to a series o f transactions concerned with 
fulfilling localised short term needs. It can be argued that D eleuze’s at times 
fevered vision offers a totally new path to freedom and self-actualization in 
contrast to the over-worn solutions o f much of modem radical thought. However, 
there is little doubt that Deleuze’s alternative neither takes fully into account the 
potential negativities o f particularism (especially apparent in the early 1990s 
following the collapse of Soviet rule in Eastern Europe) nor does it offer a clear 
blueprint or programme for liberation.
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